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[R]ationis ordinatio ad bonum commune, ab eo qui curam communitatis 
habet, promulgata.1 
I. INTRODUCTION 
The Constitution is the focus of sustained academic, political, and public debate. 
This is due, in large measure, to its central place in American public life. The 
Constitution is a—if not the2—major source of America’s identity3; it is the ultimate 
                                                                                                                                          
 * Professor of Law, University of Toledo College of Law.   
 1 ST. THOMAS AQUINAS, SUMMA THEOLOGIAE I-II, Q. 90, a. 4 (Leoninum Romae 1892).  
 2 The Declaration of Independence is the other potential primary source of American 
identity. This position has a wide following. See, e.g., SCOTT DOUGLAS GERBER, TO SECURE 
THESE RIGHTS: THE DECLARATION OF INDEPENDENCE AND CONSTITUTIONAL INTERPRETATION 
22 (1992) (providing the best defense of this view); Scott Douglas Gerber, Liberal 
Originalism: The Declaration of Independence and Constitutional Interpretation, 63 CLEV. 
ST. L. REV. (forthcoming Nov. 2014). 
 3 See SANFORD LEVINSON, CONSTITUTIONAL FAITH 11 (1988) (“‘Veneration’ of the 
Constitution has become a central, even if sometimes challenged, aspect of the American 
political tradition.”).  
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arbiter of many of the nation’s most pressing legal and social issues; it is the trump 
card in political debates. The viewpoint, argument, or perspective that has the 
Constitution as its ally, wins.4  
The Constitution’s centrality makes correctly ascertaining its meaning crucially 
important. Hence, it is no surprise that constitutional interpretation has taken center 
stage throughout American history. The Supreme Court’s interpretation of the 
Constitution has been, from the Republic’s dawn, continuously subject to praise and 
criticism.5 And outside the courts, Americans from the beginning have harnessed 
different constitutional interpretations to support their respective positions.6 
Constitutional interpretation has been especially contentious in American law and 
politics since the Progressive Era,7 and has remained so to today. 
Broadly speaking, and for a host of reasons,8 since the Warren Court, two camps 
of constitutional interpretation have emerged: originalists and nonoriginalists.9 
Nonoriginalism includes a diverse collection of scholars who argue that factors other 
                                                                                                                                          
 4 From a popular constitutionalist perspective, this claim is tautologically true because, so 
long as a popular constitutional movement is successful, its constitutional interpretation 
is/becomes the Constitution. Bruce Ackerman, The Living Constitution, 120 HARV. L. REV. 
1737, 1752 (2007); see also JACK M. BALKIN, LIVING ORIGINALISM 3 (2011) (arguing that 
popular constitutionalism occurs within the context of constitutional construction).  
 5 An early example of this is the issue of state immunity from suit, or the lack thereof, in 
Article III. This issue quickly reached the Supreme Court in Chisholm v. Georgia, 2 U.S. (2 
Dall.) 419 (1793), and, after the Court’s ruling, swiftly resulted in the Eleventh Amendment in 
1795.  
 6 See, e.g., THE KENTUCKY AND VIRGINIA RESOLUTIONS OF 1798 (1798), reprinted in 
DOCUMENTS OF AMERICAN HISTORY 178 (Henry Steele Commager ed., 7th ed. 1963) (arguing 
that the Alien and Sedition Acts violated the principle of limited and enumerated powers and 
the First Amendment); REPUBLICAN PARTY PLATFORM (1860), reprinted in DOCUMENTS OF 
AMERICAN HISTORY 363-64 (rejecting the Dred Scott Court’s interpretation of the 
Constitution).   
 7 See, e.g., JOHNATHAN O’NEILL, ORIGINALISM IN AMERICAN LAW AND POLITICS: A 
CONSTITUTIONAL HISTORY 28-39 (2005) (describing the intellectual ferment during the 
Progressive and New Deal periods that spilled over into jurisprudence and resulted in the 
rejection of originalism); CHRISTOPHER WOLFE, THE RISE OF MODERN JUDICIAL REVIEW: FROM 
CONSTITUTIONAL INTERPRETATION TO JUDGE-MADE LAW 205-40 (rev. ed. 1994) (arguing that 
modern judicial review arose during the Progressive Era). 
 8 See Lee J. Strang, Originalism as Popular Constitutionalism?: Theoretical Possibilities 
and Practical Differences, 87 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 253, 279-91 (2011) (providing three such 
reasons); see also Lawrence B. Solum, The Positive Foundations of Formalism: False 
Necessity and American Legal Realism, 127 HARV. L. REV. 2464, 2496 (2014) (book review) 
(“In the late twentieth century, an alternative jurisprudential gestalt began to emerge. The 
alternative gestalt embraced the rule of law as a central value and questioned both the 
desirability and inevitability of instrumentalist approaches to judging. Originalism emerged as 
a rival to living constitutionalism.”).  
 9 See Thomas B. Colby & Peter J. Smith, Living Originalism, 59 DUKE L.J. 239, 241 
(2009) (“For the last several decades, the primary divide in American constitutional theory has 
been between those theorists who label themselves as ‘originalists’ and those who do not.”). 
Nonoriginalists also frequently receive the label living constitutionalists. See, e.g., Ethan J. 
Leib, The Perpetual Anxiety of Living Constitutionalism, 24 CONST. COMMENT. 353 (2007) 
(contrasting with originalism, living constitutionalism).  
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than, or in addition to, the Constitution’s original meaning should govern 
constitutional interpretation.10 Most legal academics are nonoriginalists. 11  
Originalists, especially since the mid-1980s,12 have elaborated an elegant theory13 
of interpretation that focuses on the Constitution’s original meaning. Originalism 
has, over the past two decades, gained many prominent proponents on the bench and 
in the academy, and originalists have provided a variety of powerful justifications for 
originalism ranging across the philosophical spectrum.14 For instance, Professor 
Randy Barnett argued that originalism best protects individual natural rights in his 
well-received Restoring the Lost Constitution: The Presumption of Liberty.15  
Along the way, originalism has matured in response to robust criticism. For 
example, originalism shifted focus from originally intended meaning to original 
public meaning, in order to overcome criticism that the Framers’ and Ratifiers’ 
intentions either did not exist or were inaccessible.16  
Being new to the debates over constitutional interpretation, I came with “fresh 
eyes” to the subject of constitutional interpretation.17 I found that many criticisms of 
originalism contained significant truth. Consequently, my own scholarship has 
frequently been devoted to elaborating an originalism that responds to these 
reasonable criticisms. This scholarly trajectory has led me to identify some of 
originalism’s limits.  
A good example is my article, An Originalist Theory of Precedent: Originalism, 
Nonoriginalist Precedent, and the Common Good.18 There, I incorporated the insight 
of nonoriginalist critics that originalism should not lead to the overruling of all 
                                                                                                                                          
 10 See PHILIP BOBBITT, CONSTITUTIONAL INTERPRETATION 11-22 (1991) (providing the 
seminal list of six modalities of constitutional interpretation); RONALD DWORKIN, FREEDOM’S 
LAW: THE MORAL READING OF THE AMERICAN CONSTITUTION 11 (1996) (arguing that 
constitutional interpretation includes a justification facet that requires use of non-legal 
reasoning).  
 11 Strang, Originalism as Popular Constitutionalism?, supra note 8, at 287-88.  
 12 See Lawrence B. Solum, What is Originalism?: The Evolution of Contemporary 
Originalist Theory, in THE CHALLENGE OF ORIGINALISM: THEORIES OF CONSTITUTIONAL 
INTERPRETATION 12, 13-27 (Grant Huscroft & Bradley W. Miller eds., 2011) (describing 
originalism’s intellectual history).  
 13 Or family of theories.  See id. at 32-38 (describing the fixation and contribution theses).  
 14 Lee J. Strang, Originalism and the Aristotelian Tradition: Virtue’s Home in 
Originalism, 80 FORDHAM L. REV. 1997, 2013-14 (2012).  
 15 RANDY E. BARNETT, RESTORING THE LOST CONSTITUTION: THE PRESUMPTION OF 
LIBERTY 4-5 (2004).  
 16 See Paul Brest, The Misconceived Quest for the Original Understanding, 60 B.U. L. 
REV. 204, 214-18 (1980) (providing the seminal articulation of this criticism); see also Solum, 
supra note 12, at 16-27 (describing some of originalism’s changes).  
 17 Though I possessed philosophical and religious commitments that provided input and 
boundaries to my permissible conceptions of constitutional interpretation. For instance, both 
my religious and philosophical loyalties committed me to (a conception of) natural law.   
 18 Lee J. Strang, An Originalist Theory of Precedent: Originalism, Nonoriginalist 
Precedent, and the Common Good, 36 N.M. L. REV. 419, 419 (2006).  
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nonoriginalist precedent.19 I argued that originalism required federal judges to give 
“significant respect” to constitutional precedent, including nonoriginalist precedent.20 
In this same vein, much of my scholarship has explained how originalism meets the 
various criticisms that have been leveled against it and, in doing so, how originalism 
itself is made better.21  
At the same time, I believe, originalism’s promise remains. Originalism’s 
promise is three-fold. First, originalism promises that it can paint constitutional 
interpretation in the most normatively attractive light. Not ideal results.  Instead—on 
balance and systemically—normatively more attractive results than its competitors. 
Second, originalism promises that constitutional interpretation can fit the key facets 
of our Constitution. These key facets include, for example, the Constitution’s 
writtenness and its particular origins, facets that originalism better fits than 
alternative methods of constitutional interpretation. Third, originalism promises that 
constitutional interpretation can respect judges’ capacities. Judges’ pivotal role 
necessitates that interpretative methodologies work with their capacities, which 
originalism does, better than nonoriginalism.   
In this Symposium Essay, I summarize originalism’s promise and limits. Part II 
succinctly explains originalism’s promise. Part III briefly describes originalism’s 
limits. Part IV then suggests that originalism’s limits contribute to its promise.  
II. ORIGINALISM’S PROMISES 
A. Introduction 
Originalism makes three promises that, together, make originalism attractive, or 
at least more attractive than alternatives. These promises together constitute 
originalism’s claim that constitutional interpretation is most legitimate when it is 
performed via originalism.  
B. Originalism Promises to Paint Constitutional Interpretation in a 
 More Normatively Attractive Light 
1. Introduction 
First, consistently used, originalism promises to paint constitutional 
interpretation in the most normatively attractive light possible or, at least, that 
originalism leads to more normatively attractive results than alternative methods.  
                                                                                                                                          
 19 This was one of Brest’s criticisms. Brest, supra note 16, at 223-24, 230-31. It was also 
pervasive in the literature critical of originalism. Strang, Originalism, Nonoriginalist 
Precedent, and the Common Good, supra note 18, at 430-31. 
 20 Strang, Originalism, Nonoriginalist Precedent, and the Common Good, supra note 18, 
at 447.  
 21 See Strang, Originalism and the Aristotelian Tradition, supra note 14, at 1997 (arguing 
that originalism’s theoretical transformation did not undermine it because originalism can 
incorporate virtue ethics); Lee J. Strang, An Originalist Theory of Precedent: The Privileged 
Place of Originalist Precedent, 2010 BYU L. REV. 1729, 1731 (2010) (arguing that 
originalism holds a robust place for the practice of precedent and therefore adequately fits 
existing American legal practice); Lee J. Strang, Originalism and the “Challenge of Change”: 
Abduced-Principle Originalism and Other Mechanisms by Which Originalism Sufficiently 
Accommodates Changed Social Conditions, 60 HASTINGS L.J. 927. 927-29 (2009) (arguing 
that originalism can meet the challenge of changed societal conditions).  
4https://engagedscholarship.csuohio.edu/clevstlrev/vol63/iss1/8
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Since the publication of Professor Keith Whittington’s Constitutional 
Interpretation,22 in 1999, originalists have proposed normative justifications for 
originalism that cover the figurative waterfront. In other words, originalists have 
provided arguments from the major possible justificatory perspectives. These 
normative groundings fall into two main categories: internal and external 
justifications.23 I describe each, in turn.  
2. Internal Justifications 
Internal justifications take the widely-accepted facets of American constitutional 
practice for granted and argue that originalism matches those practices better than 
alternative interpretative methodologies. Internal justifications do not attempt to 
justify the key practices of American constitutional interpretation; instead, the 
practices are “given.” The goal of internal justifications is to make originalism 
relatively more attractive by showing its close fit to those practices.  
For instance, Whittington argued that the fact that the Constitution is written 
suggests that originalism is the proper means of constitutional interpretation while, at 
the same time, excluding other modes of interpretation.24 Whittington’s argument 
was similar to Barnett’s contention that the Constitution’s “writtenness” serves four 
functions: evidentiary, cautionary, channeling, and clarifying.25 Only originalism, 
Barnett contended, could facilitate these four functions.26 Therefore, the 
Constitution’s writtenness warrants originalism.  
Professor Lawrence Solum utilized Gricean philosophy of language to conclude 
that the Constitution’s text’s meaning is its semantic meaning, which, in turn, is its 
original meaning.27 According to Solum, the fact that the Constitution is a written 
communication to the public selects originalism as the appropriate interpretative 
methodology.28  
Professors McGinnis and Rappaport recently tied originalism to the structural 
mechanism of the Constitution’s original adoption and adoption of subsequent 
amendments via supermajoritarian means.29 Their argument was anchored to the 
                                                                                                                                          
 22 KEITH E. WHITTINGTON, CONSTITUTIONAL INTERPRETATION: TEXTUAL MEANING, 
ORIGINAL INTENT, & JUDICIAL REVIEW 110 (1999); see also ANTONIN SCALIA, A MATTER OF 
INTERPRETATION: FEDERAL COURTS AND THE LAW 9, 17, 46 (1997) (identifying democracy, the 
Rule of Law, and negative consequences, as reasons to reject nonoriginalism).    
 23 WHITTINGTON, supra note 22, at 110; see also RONALD DWORKIN, TAKING RIGHTS 
SERIOUSLY 106-07 (1977) (articulating the analogous categories of fit and justification).  
 24 WHITTINGTON, supra note 22, at 50.  
 25 BARNETT, supra note 15, at 100-03.  
 26 Id. at 103-09.  
 27 See Lawrence B. Solum, Semantic Originalism, at 34 (Nov. 22, 2008), available at 
http://papers.ssrn.com/abstract=1120244 [hereinafter Solum, Semantic Originalism] (relying 
on PAUL GRICE, STUDIES IN THE WAY OF WORDS (1989)); see also Lawrence B. Solum, 
Communicative Content and Legal Content, 89 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 479, 489 (2013) (same). 
 28 Solum, Semantic Originalism, supra note 27, at 5, 50-57.  
 29 JOHN O. MCGINNIS & MICHAEL B. RAPPAPORT, ORIGINALISM AND THE GOOD 
CONSTITUTION 62-80 (2013). McGinnis and Rappaport also provided an external justification 
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Constitution’s key adoption provisions, Articles VII and V, which require two-thirds 
and three-fourths of states, respectively, to adopt and amend the constitution.30  
Perhaps most focused on a taken-for-granted facet of our constitutional practice 
is Professor Christopher Green’s claim that the Constitution’s text itself identified 
originalism as the proper interpretative methodology.31 Green argued that the 
Constitution’s repeated use of indexicals—for example, references to itself such as 
“this Constitution”—shows that the referenced Constitution is a text whose meaning 
was fixed at the time of ratification.32 Green then coupled this move with the 
Supremacy Clause, to argue that the Constitution’s original meaning the “supreme 
Law of the Land.”33  
3. External Justifications 
External justifications argue that originalism will lead to a good state of affairs, 
or a better state of affairs than other interpretative methods.34 Here, originalists have 
offered a broad array of arguments.  
Professor Barnett, for instance, contended that originalism best protects natural 
rights. It does so through two steps. First, the Constitution’s original meaning is 
rights protective. This follows, according to Barnett, from the federal government’s 
limited and enumerated powers, coupled with the rule of construction—a 
“presumption of liberty”—against rights-infringement located in the Ninth 
Amendment (and the Privileges or Immunities Clause).35 However, if judges were 
free to depart from this rights-protective original meaning, then the Constitution’s 
protection of natural rights would falter. Therefore, Barnett argued that originalism is 
necessary to “lock-in” the Constitution’s rights-protectiveness.36  
Whittington argued that originalism best facilitates popular sovereignty.37 It does 
so in two primary ways: first, originalism facilitates popular sovereignty by 
protecting the constitutional judgments of the American people, embodied in the 
Constitution, from judicial abrogation38; and, second, originalism incentivizes the 
                                                                                                                                          
for originalism. See id. at 81-99 (arguing that originalism is normatively attractive because it 
creates the best interpretative consequences).  
 30 U.S. CONST. art. V; id. art. VII.  
 31 Christopher R. Green, “This Constitution”: Constitutional Indexicals as a Basis for 
Textualist Semi-Originalism, 84 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1607, 1607-14 (2009).  
 32 Id. at 1614.  
 33 Id. at 1610-12, 1614.  
 34 See Cass R. Sunstein, There is Nothing that Interpretation Just Is,  
http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2489088 (last visited Oct. 2, 2014) 
(arguing that “[a]ny approach [to constitutional interpretation] must be defended on normative 
grounds”).   
 35 BARNETT, supra note 15, at 253-69, 274-77.     
 36 Id. at 105-06. 
 37 WHITTINGTON, supra note 22, at 111.  
 38 Id. 
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American people to exercise popular sovereignty by preserving a space for their 
constitutionally-embodied constitutional judgments.39  
Most recently, Professors McGinnis and Rappaport provided a third major 
argument: that originalism provides for the best consequences.40 McGinnis and 
Rappaport argued that, on balance, constitutional decisions made by supermajority 
are generally superior to judgments made through other decision processes, in 
particular majority vote.41 Supermajorities adopted and amended the Constitution, 
and these supermajorities of Americans understood the meaning of the texts they 
ratified using originalism.42 Therefore, originalism is necessary to preserve the 
meaning that emerged from these valuable supermajority processes. 
4. Originalism Facilitates Human Flourishing 
My own justification for originalism follows a similar two-pronged path: 
Originalism best fits the widely-accepted facets of our constitutional practice, and it 
also leads to a the best set of conditions for human flourishing for Americans today.  
My conception of originalism is drawn from the Aristotelian philosophical 
tradition.43 My conception assumes that the Aristotelian philosophical tradition’s 
description of reality—in particular, its description of human beings, law, and 
society—is accurate, and applies its concepts to the United States Constitution. 
Three fundamental components of the Aristotelian philosophical tradition are 
needed for purposes of this brief Essay: human flourishing, virtue, and law. Human 
flourishing is when a human possesses deep, abiding, happiness.44 One flourishes 
when one reasonably participates in the basic human goods, such as life, knowledge, 
                                                                                                                                          
 39 Id. 
 40 MCGINNIS & RAPPAPORT, supra note 29, at 19-20.  
 41 Id. at 33-61. 
 42 Id. at 62-80. 
 43 The Aristotelian philosophical tradition is the tradition of philosophical inquiry that 
includes Aristotle and St. Thomas Aquinas as the central figures. See Strang, Originalism and 
the Aristotelian Tradition, supra note 14, at 2015-16 (briefly summarizing the tradition); Lee 
J. Strang, The Clash of Rival and Incompatible Philosophical Traditions Within Constitutional 
Interpretation: Originalism Grounded in the Central Western Philosophical Tradition, 28 
HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 909, 916-28 (2005) (providing a first-cut explanation of the pertinent 
facets of the tradition); see also ALASDAIR MACINTYRE, GOD, PHILOSOPHY, UNIVERSITIES: A 
SELECTIVE HISTORY OF THE CATHOLIC PHILOSOPHICAL TRADITION (2009) (describing a 
tradition that includes the Aristotelian tradition, but which is broader). 
 44 See ARISTOTLE, NICOMACHEAN ETHICS 1098a, (D.P. Chase, trans., 1947) (“[T]he Good 
of Man comes to be ‘a working of the Soul in the way of Excellence,’ . . . in the way of the 
best and most perfect Excellence.”); ST. THOMAS AQUINAS, SUMMA THEOLOGICA, at Q. 5, a. 5 
(Fathers of the English Dominican Province trans., Benziger Bros., 1947) (“Imperfect 
happiness that can be had in this life, can be acquired by man by his natural powers, in the 
same way as virtue, in whose operation it consists.”); JOHN FINNIS, NATURAL LAW AND 
NATURAL RIGHTS 103 (1980) (describing happiness as the reasonable participation in the basic 
human goods). 
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and friendship.45 One’s life will be less rich, less full, for instance, if one does not 
engage in friendships.46  
Virtue is both constitutive of human flourishing and a mechanism to pursue 
flourishing.47 Virtue is part-and-parcel of human flourishing because the good life 
includes virtuous activity. For instance, the good life does not include timidity or 
rashness; instead, to be happy, one must take (only) reasonable risks.48 Virtue is also 
a means to secure flourishing, because the virtues hone one’s capacities to identify 
the basic human goods and to reasonably pursue those goods. For example, 
temperance enables one to reasonably pursue money and to not let desire for any one 
(created) good unreasonably dominate one’s life.49  
Law is one of the key mechanisms that humans utilize to achieve human 
flourishing. For a host of reasons,50 humans must utilize law to set the background 
conditions—the common good—that make it possible for humans to flourish.51 To 
take an example from the first-year law school curriculum: private property is 
(generally) necessary for human flourishing,52 but there is no one-size-fits-all private 
property law scheme.53 Therefore, human societies utilize law to construct a 
reasonable set of property law doctrines.54  
Turning to the United States Constitution, my account of originalism fits a 
number of the Constitution’s facets. For instance, the Constitution set out its purpose 
in the Preamble.55 The Preamble identified the Constitution’s purposes in terms of 
                                                                                                                                          
 45 See JOHN FINNIS, AQUINAS 107-08 (1998) (describing St. Thomas’ explanation of 
happiness).  
 46 See JANE AUSTEN, MANSFIELD PARK 101, 104 (1906) (describing Fanny Price being left 
“all alone” on the Sotherton estate as a metaphor for her loneliness caused by lack of 
friendships); VICTOR HUGO, LES MISÉRABLES (1862) (describing Javert’s life as one of 
“privations, isolation, self-denial, and chastity— never any amusement”). 
 47 See Strang, Originalism and the Aristotelian Tradition, supra note 14, at 2022-24 
(describing this relationship). 
 48 See HUGO, supra note 46 (describing Jean Valjean’s courageous pursuit of redemption); 
SIGRID UNDSET, KRISTIN LAVRANSDATTER 1920-22 (2005) (describing Kristin’s rash romance 
with and marriage to Erlend Nikulausson, and its negative effects). 
 49 See CHARLES DICKENS, A CHRISTMAS CAROL 2 (2009) (“Scrooge! a squeezing, 
wrenching, grasping, scraping, clutching, covetous, old sinner!”). 
 50 YVES SIMON, A GENERAL THEORY OF AUTHORITY 47 (1962); YVES R. SIMON, 
PHILOSOPHY OF DEMOCRATIC GOVERNMENT 59 (1951); see also SCOTT SHAPIRO, LEGALITY 
131-34, 161-63 (2011) (describing reasons for humans’ resort to legality).   
 51 FINNIS, supra note 45, at 155.  
 52 ST. THOMAS, supra note 1, at I-II, Q. 66, a. 2. 
 53 See id. (“[T]he division of possessions is not according to the natural law, but rather 
arose from human agreement which belongs to positive law.”). 
 54 This creative use of positive law is what St. Thomas labeled “determinatio.” Id. at I-II, 
Q. 91, a. 3. 
 55 U.S. CONST. pmbl; see also JOSEPH STORY, COMMENTARIES ON THE CONSTITUTION OF 
THE UNITED STATES §§ 218-19 (reprint ed. 1987) (1833) (describing the Preamble as the “key 
to open the mind of the makers”).   
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the American People’s common good, a concept at home in the Aristotelian 
philosophical tradition,56 but harder to square with other conceptions of 
originalism.57  
My conception of originalism also offers a normatively attractive external 
justification for originalism. Originalism, on my account, provides two 
complimentary arguments, one “thin” and one “thick.”58 The thin argument is 
relatively independent of controversial claims regarding the Good, while the thicker 
argument relies on the Aristotelian tradition’s conception of human flourishing. 
The thin account argues that the creation of positive law, in a republic like ours, 
paradigmatically proceeds by legislators positing legal norms that are: (1) 
authoritative—because they originated from the elected legislature; (2) prudential—
because the legislators utilized their prudential judgment to solve a societal problem; 
and (3) social-ordering—because the laws order the governeds’ lives.59 For the 
purposes of this Essay, this conception of the lawmaking process has three attractive 
facets: first, it portrays a reasoned process; second, it emphasizes the legislators’ 
political wisdom; and third, it draws on the legislature’s legitimacy.60 This thin 
account contends that originalism is the best interpretative methodology because it 
best facilitates these three facets in the context of constitutional interpretation.  
Originalism does so by identifying the communication, embodied in law, from the 
authoritative lawmaker, to the public.61  
My conception of originalism analogizes this picture of positive law’s creation 
with the Framing and Ratification that produced the Constitution. The Framing and 
Ratification produced the “supreme Law of the Land.”62 It was the result of 
prudential judgment.63 From the requisite ninth state’s ratification, the Constitution 
ordered—and continues to order—Americans’ lives.64  
                                                                                                                                          
 56 Strang, The Clash of Rival and Incompatible Philosophical Traditions Within 
Constitutional Interpretation, supra note 43, at 959. 
 57 See Strang, Originalism, Nonoriginalist Precedent, and the Common Good, supra note 
18, at 455-56 (arguing that my conception of originalism better fits the Preamble than did a 
natural rights conception of originalism). 
 58 Cf. JOHN RAWLS, POLITICAL LIBERALISM 212-54 (1993) (distinguishing between public 
and nonpublic reasons). 
 59 Strang, The Clash of Rival and Incompatible Philosophical Traditions Within 
Constitutional Interpretation, supra note 43, at 983-92, 998-1001. 
 60 See Steven D. Smith, Law Without Mind, 88 MICH. L. REV. 104, 117 (1989) (“The 
originalist assigns responsibility primarily to legislators, who ordinarily make and express 
their decisions in the form of statutes.”).  
 61 See Larry Alexander, Simple-Minded Originalism, in THE CHALLENGE OF ORIGINALISM, 
supra note 12, at 90 (“An intended meaning of an utterance is the uptake the speaker intends 
in his audience.”). Cf. Solum, Semantic Originalism, supra note 27, at 50-59 (arguing that 
Gricean “sentence meaning,” appropriately modified, is the best conception of the 
Constitution’s original meaning). 
 62 U.S. CONST. art. VI, cl. 2.  
 63 See JAMES MADISON, NOTES OF DEBATES IN THE FEDERAL CONVENTION OF 1787 (1840) 
(providing a first-hand account of the give-and-take of debate in the Philadelphia 
Convention); THE DEBATES IN THE SEVERAL STATE CONVENTIONS ON THE ADOPTION OF THE 
FEDERAL CONSTITUTION, AS RECOMMENDED BY THE GENERAL CONVENTION AT PHILADELPHIA 
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Originalism leverages the three facets I identified earlier—a reasoned process, 
legislative wisdom, and democratic legitimacy—by adhering to the Constitution’s 
determinate original meaning. Therefore, regardless of one’s conception of the 
Good, originalism is more likely to produce the conditions necessary for Americans 
to flourish than the alternative, judicial updating.65  
The thicker argument tracks the thin argument, and adds the more-robust 
substantive claim that the Constitution’s original meaning ensures the background 
conditions appropriate to human flourishing. This substantive claim is supportable 
both indirectly and directly.  
First, indirectly, numerous facets of the Constitution’s history, meaning, and 
structure, suggest that the Constitution’s original meaning facilitates human 
flourishing. As noted above, the process of Framing and Ratification utilized the 
Framers’ and Ratifiers’ wisdom to construct a governmental structure that would 
facilitate human flourishing.66 Also, the supermajoritarian processes by which the 
Constitution was ratified utilized the American People’s wisdom—and self-
interest—to approve only those governmental structures that would be conducive to 
their and their descendants’ flourishing.67 Third, the Constitution’s writtenness itself 
both facilitated the creation of a better constitution and preserves that substantively 
good constitutional meaning.68  
Second, and more directly, the Constitution’s original meaning provides the 
conditions for human flourishing because it preserves a robust sphere for ordered 
individual freedom vis-á-vis the federal government,69 and it does so in multiple 
ways. First, the Constitution’s original meaning protects natural rights.70 Second, the 
Constitution’s original meaning preserves individual freedom via limits on federal 
power through the constitutional principles of limited and enumerated powers, 
separation of powers, check and balances, and federalism.71 Third, the Constitution’s 
                                                                                                                                          
IN 1787 (Jonathan Elliot ed., 2d ed., 1836) (summarizing ratification debates on the 
Constitution). 
 64 See Gary Lawson & Guy Seidman, When Did the Constitution Become Law?, 77 NOTRE 
DAME L. REV. 1, 1 (2001) (concluding that some of the Constitution became law at different 
times, but for the most part during the Summer of 1788); see also Owings v. Speed, 18 U.S. (5 
Wheat.) 420, 421-23 (1820) (ruling that the Constitution began “operat[ion]” on March 4, 
1789). 
 65 Smith, supra note 60, at 117-18.  
 66 See supra notes 68-70. 
 67 U.S. CONST. art. VII, cl. 1.  
 68 See BARNETT, supra note 15, at 101 (identifying the four functions of writtenness).  
 69 See id. at 53-60, 72-86, 153-90, 224-73 (arguing that the federal government is 
authorized to protect and is limited by natural rights); ROBERT P. GEORGE, MAKING MEN 
MORAL: CIVIL LIBERTIES AND PUBLIC MORALITY 189-227 (1993) (articulating a “pluralist 
perfectionist” conception of human freedom); Lee J. Strang, Originalism and Legitimacy, 11 
KAN. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 657 (2002) (arguing that the federal government is a minimalist state).  
 70 BARNETT, supra note 15, at 253-69, 274-77.  
 71 See Gary Lawson & Patricia B. Granger, The “Proper” Scope of Federal Power: A 
Jurisdictional Interpretation of the Sweeping Clause, 43 DUKE L.J. 267, 326-34 (1993) 
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original meaning creates a wide space for democratic processes to operate, both on 
the federal and state levels.72 The wide berth originalism provides free human 
activity, which is constitutive of human flourishing, is central to its case for 
normative attractiveness.  
Third, and most directly—and most controversially—the original meaning is also 
substantively protective of human flourishing because it protects activities necessary 
to human flourishing and does not protect activities not conducive to flourishing.73 
For instance, the Constitution protects the freedom of speech,74 but it does not 
protect abortion from government restriction.75 To make a persuasive case for this 
claim would require a detailed “cashing-out” of the Constitution’s original meaning, 
which is beyond the scope of this Essay.76  
C. Key Characteristics 
Originalism also promises that, unlike alternative interpretative methods, it 
makes sense of the Constitution’s key features. I discussed some of those features, 
such as the Constitution’s writtenness, above, in Parts I and II.B.2. Here, I have in 
mind the key facet of American constitutional law: the centrality of one particular 
written document that originated at one particular time.77 This fact is so deeply 
entrenched that, even when it is implausible, the Supreme Court claims that it is 
doing the Constitution’s bidding, not the Court’s.78 
The document that begins “We the People of the United States,”79 currently 
located in Rotunda for the Charters of Freedom in the National Archives,80 and 
                                                                                                                                          
(summarizing the Necessary and Proper Clause’s role in maintaining the Constitution’s 
structural principles). 
 72 See Strang, The Clash of Rival and Incompatible Philosophical Traditions Within 
Constitutional Interpretation, supra note 43, at 981-83 (summarizing the robust role for 
democratic processes within originalism). 
 73 See Strang, Originalism as Popular Constitutionalism?, supra note 8, at 285-87 
(“Originalism, applied to the American Constitution, regularly results in conservative 
outputs.”).  
 74 U.S. CONST., amend. I.  
 75 See Strang, Originalism, Nonoriginalist Precedent, and the Common Good, supra note 
18, at 482-83 (summarizing the literature).  
 76 See Strang, Originalism as Popular Constitutionalism?, supra note 8, at 279-87 
(suggesting that the alignment of liberal legal academics and nonoriginalism and conservative-
libertarian legal academics and originalism is evidence that originalism leads to conservative 
results). 
 77 See Richard S. Kay, American Constitutionalism, in CONSTITUTIONALISM: 
PHILOSOPHICAL FOUNDATIONS 31 (Larry Alexander ed. 1998) (“What commands obedience is 
not a mere set of words, but the expression of an intentional historical-political act.”); Green, 
supra note 31, at 1614 (concluding that “this Constitution” refers to “historically situated 
Constitution that . . . receives meaning at the time of the Founding”). 
 78 See, e.g., Dickerson v. United States, 530 U.S. 428, 440 (2000) (“Miranda is 
constitutionally based”); id. at 444 (“Miranda announced a constitutional rule”). 
 79 U.S. CONST. pmbl. 
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commonly known as the Constitution of the United States, is the ultimate source of 
American constitutional law.81 This particular document possesses a unique 
provenance:82 it arrived in the Archives’ Rotunda because it is the only document 
that went through the Framing and Ratification process.83  
The Framing and Ratification process was Americans’ response to the problems 
presented by the Articles of Confederation.84 The process drew on Americans’ 
wisdom, resolved and compromised contentious issues, and provided the framework 
for American society.85 The Constitution bears the marks—both good86 and ill87—of 
that process.  
Originalism places this specific document at the heart of the interpretative 
enterprise. All conceptions of originalism share the fundamental disposition to treat 
the document’s original meaning as the sole source of determinate constitutional 
meaning.88 Originalism’s attitude of faithfulness of the United States Constitution 
shows in many ways. To take a counter-intuitive piece of evidence, nonoriginalists 
frequently criticize originalism for its failure to reach normatively acceptable 
results.89 I think this criticism is overblown90 but, accepting its cogency for purposes 
                                                                                                                                          
 80 National Archives, Rotunda for the Charters of Freedom, available at 
http://www.archives.gov/museum/visit/rotunda.html (last visited July 28, 2014). 
 81 See also Donald Drakeman, What’s the Point of Originalism?, 37 HARV. J.L. & PUB. 
POL’Y 1123, 1125 (2014) (describing the results of a survey that indicated that 90% of 
Americans believe that the Constitution’s original meaning should play a role in Supreme 
Court interpretations, and two-thirds citing the Framers’ intent as the most important source of 
that meaning). 
 82 See Joseph Raz, On the Authority and Interpretations of Constitutions: Some 
Preliminaries, in CONSTITUTIONALISM: PHILOSOPHICAL FOUNDATIONS, supra note 77, at 158 
(“[T]he identity of the lawmaker is material to the validity of the law, at least in the case of 
enacted law.”). 
 83 National Archives, The Constitution of the United States: A History, available at 
http://www.archives.gov/exhibits/charters/constitution_history.html (last visited Aug. 20, 
2014). 
 84 Strang, The Clash of Rival and Incompatible Philosophical Traditions Within 
Constitutional Interpretation, supra note 43, at 951-57 (summarizing this process). 
 85 FORREST MCDONALD, E PLURIBUS UNUM: THE FORMATION OF THE AMERICAN REPUBLIC 
1776-1790, at 259-371 (2d ed. 1979).   
 86 See, e.g., U.S. CONST. art. I, § 1, cl. 1 (“All legislative Powers herein granted . . . .”) 
(anchoring the principle of limited and enumerated powers).  
 87 See, e.g., U.S. CONST. art. III, § 1 (“The Judges . . . shall hold their Offices during good 
Behaviour . . . .”) (providing the basis for presumptive life tenure of federal judges). 
 88 See Solum, Semantic Originalism, supra note 27, at 2-4 (describing the fixation thesis).  
 89 William P. Marshall, Progressive Constitutionalism, Originalism, and the Significance 
of Landmark Decisions in Evaluating Constitutional Theory, 72 OHIO ST. L.J. 1251, 1251-52 
(2011); see also Joel K. Goldstein, Constitutional Change, Originalism, and the Vice 
Presidency, 16 U. PA. J. CONST. L. 369, 376 n.22 (2013) (listing sources making this claim). 
 90 Cf. Strang, Originalism and the “Challenge of Change,” supra note 21, at 992 (arguing 
that, based on originalism’s demonstrated ability to change operative constitutional doctrine in 
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of this argument, originalists should “bite the bullet” and agree with the criticism: 
originalism cannot deliver “Our Perfect Constitution.”91 Instead, originalism’s 
inability to always deliver normatively attractive results shows that originalism is 
wedded to our actual written—and fallible—Constitution. For instance, Article III 
requires presumptive lifetime tenure for federal judges, and this is normatively 
unattractive.92 Similarly, the Due Process Clauses’ do not protect the right to life of 
unborn human beings,93 and this injustice should be rectified through constitutional 
amendment.94  
Of course, we should expect that a human artifact, such as the Constitution—
especially a constitution!—is95 imperfect.96 Originalism fits this fact. Originalism’s 
fidelity to our historically-conditioned Constitution is in stark contrast to the core 
nonoriginalist claim: the Constitution’s original meaning is one argument among 
many, and that other “modalities” of constitutional argumentation, including baldly 
normative ones, may limit or displace the Constitution’s determinate original 
meaning.97 For instance, Professor Mitchell Berman recently argued that current 
popular constitutional judgments on the Natural Born Citizenship Clause undermine 
originalism.98 
Originalism’s pride-of-place for written Constitution also enables originalism to 
emphasize many of the Constitution’s other key characteristics. For example, Article 
V provides a mechanism to amend the Constitution. Article III authorizes federal 
judges to exercise “judicial Power,” the power to decide cases and controversies.99 
                                                                                                                                          
response to societal change, originalism’s critics bear the burden of showing where 
originalism failed to meet the challenge of change, and that its failure to do so counts it out as 
a viable method of constitutional interpretation).  
 91 See Henry P. Monaghan, Our Perfect Constitution, 56 N.Y.U. L. REV. 353 (1981) 
(describing the aspiration of nonoriginalist legal academics to create “Our Perfect 
Constitution” through creative judicial updating).  
 92 See Steven G. Calabresi & James Lindgren, Term Limits for the Supreme Court: Life 
Tenure Reconsidered, 29 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 769, 771 (2006) (“We believe the 
American constitutional rule granting life tenure to Supreme Court Justices is fundamentally 
flawed.”).  
 93 See U.S. CONST. amend. XIV § 1 (“All persons born or naturalized . . . .”) (emphasis 
added); see also Planned Parenthood of Se. Pa. v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 979, 980 (1992) 
(Scalia, J., dissenting) (“[T]he Constitution says absolutely nothing about it.”). 
 94 See Strang, Originalism, Nonoriginalist Precedent, and the Common Good, supra note 
18, at 483-84 (describing Roe and the abortions it licenses as unjust). 
 95 Or may become so, in light of changed conditions. Kay, supra note 77, at 34.  
 96 See id. at 32 (“[T]hose rules do not represent the optimum arrangements that might be 
imagined . . . .”). 
 97 See BOBBITT, supra note 10, at 11-22 (providing a list of six modalities of constitutional 
interpretation). 
 98 Mitchell N. Berman, Reflective Equilibrium and Constitutional Method: Lessons from 
John McCain and the  Natural-Born Citizenship Clause, in THE CHALLENGE OF ORIGINALISM: 
THEORIES OF CONSTITUTIONAL INTERPRETATION, supra note 12, at 261-77. 
 99 See Saikrishna Prakash & John Yoo, Against Interpretative Supremacy, 103 MICH. L. 
REV. 1539, 1541 (2005) (book review) (“Judicial review is merely the means by which federal 
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The thin text of Article III does not indicate a power to update the Constitution using 
nonoriginalist modalities. This compliments Article V100 by preserving the attendant 
benefits of the amendment process, which are otherwise undermined by judicial 
updating via nonoriginalist precedent.101  
D. Judicial Capacity 
Third, originalism promises to fit judges’ competences.  Federal judges are at the 
center of American constitutional interpretation.102 A plausible theory of 
constitutional interpretation must both play to the strengths of these judges and 
respect their limited capacities.  
Originalism respects federal judges’ capacities. Originalism asks federal judges 
to ascertain and to apply the Constitution’s original meaning and originalist 
precedent.103 Both tasks are within federal judges’ competency. 
Starting with the latter first, federal judges, like all lawyers, are trained to be 
adept at working with precedent. Indeed, this proposition is so uncontroversial that a 
school of constitutional interpretation has emerged called common law 
constitutionalism.104 Originalism similarly prescribes that precedent should dominate 
judges’ decision-making processes in our mature legal system.105 Originalist judges’ 
initial inclination is to find the relevant precedent and apply it.106 
Federal judges also possess the capacity to ascertain and apply the Constitution’s 
original meaning.107 Originalism’s focal case asks judges to ascertain and apply the 
Constitution’s original meaning. This requires judges to ascertain the text’s 
conventional meaning, when it was ratified. This is a task that lawyers are trained to 
do in a host of areas including statutory and administrative law. This is a task federal 
judges have the resources to do well. They have access to the pertinent constitutional 
text, structure, Framing and Ratification debates, and larger societal debates, to 
                                                                                                                                          
judges implement the Constitution’s higher authority in the course of deciding cases or 
controversies.”).    
 100 See PHILIP HAMBURGER, LAW AND JUDICIAL DUTY 2 (2008) (arguing that judicial power 
is the authority “to decide in accord with the law of the land”).    
 101 See MCGINNIS & RAPPAPORT, supra note 29, at 85-94 (cataloguing the negative 
consequences of judicial updating). 
 102 See DWORKIN, supra note 10, at 12 (“[P]ractice has now settled that courts do have a 
responsibility to declare and act on their best understanding of what the Constitution 
forbids.”).    
 103 See Strang, The Privileged Place of Originalist Precedent, supra note 21 at, 1729, 1731 
(describing the robust role of precedent in originalism).    
 104 E.g., DAVID A. STRAUSS, THE LIVING CONSTITUTION (2010).    
 105 Strang, The Privileged Place of Originalist Precedent, supra note 21, at 1786-88.  
 106 Id.  
 107 Critics have questioned originalism’s ability to deliver on these promises. See, e.g., Eric 
Berger, Originalism’s Pretenses, 16 U. PA. J. CONST. L. 329, 331 (2013) (“[O]riginalism often 
cannot fulfill its promises of fixation and constraint.”). In a future article, I hope to address 
these sorts of criticisms in depth. 
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ascertain the text’s conventional meaning.108 Also, judges’ jobs are made easier from 
the wealth of originalist scholarship that has proliferated over the past three decades, 
and continues to be refined.109 Furthermore, judges have access to computer-assisted 
research technologies to help them (and scholars) ascertain the Constitution’s 
original meaning.110  
This is unlike nonoriginalism, which asks lawyers to, for example: (1) choose the 
morally best ruling (Dworkin);111 or (2) ascertain the “popular constitutional 
meaning” (Kramer);112 or (3) choose the most economically efficient rule (Posner);113 
or (4) pick the legal scholar’s favorite value(s) that judges should maximize.114 For 
none of these tasks are federal judges especially trained or institutionally suited.  
III. ORIGINALISM’S LIMITS 
A. Introduction 
Originalism is subject to significant constraints; I describe three below. In the 
end, however, I briefly conclude that, despite—and, in part, because of—these 
constraints, originalism remains the best method of constitutional interpretation.  
B. An Imperfect Constitution 
First, originalism’s promise that it provides a more normatively attractive picture 
of constitutional interpretation than other methods, though true, does not mean that 
originalism provides a “perfect” Constitution.115 There are instances where, 
regardless of one’s ethical commitments, the Constitution’s original meaning is 
unjust or at least imprudent.116 From my own perspective, the Constitution’s failure 
to include unborn human beings within its protection from public and publicly-
sanctioned violence is a grave defect. Similarly, the Constitution’s conferral of 
                                                                                                                                          
 108 See, e.g., Constitution Society, www.constitution.org (last visited Aug. 20, 2014) 
(providing access to a plethora of relevant sources).  
 109 See, e.g., District of Columbia v. Heller, 554 U.S. 570, 605-19 (2008) (reflecting heavy 
reliance on originalist scholarship).    
 110 See, e.g., Randy E. Barnett, New Evidence of the Original Meaning of the Commerce 
Clause, 55 ARK. L. REV. 847, 856-63 (2003) (utilizing computer-assisted research techniques 
to confirm the original meaning of “Commerce”).     
 111 DWORKIN, supra note 10, at 2.    
 112 LARRY D. KRAMER, THE PEOPLE THEMSELVES: POPULAR CONSTITUTIONALISM AND 
JUDICIAL REVIEW 149 (2005).    
 113 E.g., RICHARD A. POSNER, THE PROBLEMATICS OF MORAL AND LEGAL THEORY 240-64 
(1999). 
 114 See Monaghan, supra note 91. 
 115 Id. 
 116 One of the manifestations of this is the widespread claim by nonoriginalists that 
nonoriginalist precedent undermines originalism, which is partially premised on the 
proposition that the nonoriginalist precedents in question are just. See, e.g., DWORKIN, supra 
note 10, at 12-13 (pointing to Brown as an example). 
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presumptive life-tenure on federal judges may at one time have made sense, but does 
not make sense today, for a host of reasons.117 
That being said, for many reasons I listed earlier—the Framing and Ratification 
process’s utilization of the Framers’ and Ratifiers’ prudential judgment, the 
supermajoritarian process by which the Constitution was adopted that harnessed the 
American People’s prudential judgment and self-interest, the democratic processes 
the Constitution fosters, and the substance of the original meaning itself—I believe 
that originalism creates a better state of affairs than the alternatives. Indeed, as I 
argued above, originalism’s failure to deliver a perfect constitution is one of its 
virtues.  
C. No Answer for Some Constitutional Questions 
Second, though originalism paints the Constitution’s text in a positive light, the 
Constitution’s text is limited; it does not answer all constitutional questions. 
Originalists have described three major ways in which the original meaning’s force 
is limited.  
First, many originalists have adopted the concept of constitutional 
construction.118 Constitutional construction occurs when the Constitution’s original 
meaning does not answer a constitutional question; the original meaning may narrow 
the universe of possible answers, but it leaves the interpreter with choice.119 These 
originalists have concluded that the Constitution’s original meaning is 
underdetermined in at least some situations120: it does not answer all interpretative 
questions.121 That is because these originalists focus on the constitutional text’s 
original meaning—its conventional meaning, when it was ratified.122  
This move toward original public meaning originalism has the benefit of 
avoiding the criticism that originalism is impossible in principle, or too difficult as a 
practical matter.123 However, it also has the side-effect of narrowing the thickness 
and breadth of the Constitution’s meaning, with the result that the Constitution’s 
original meaning is more likely to be underdetermined.124  
In these situations—when the Constitution’s original meaning is 
underdetermined—I have elsewhere argued that federal judges must defer to the 
                                                                                                                                          
 117 Calabresi & Lindgren, supra note 92, at 769. 
 118 See Keith E. Whittington, Originalism: A Critical Introduction, 82 FORDHAM L. REV. 
375, 403-04 (2013) (providing the current state of the scholarship on this point). 
 119 See KEITH E. WHITTINGTON, CONSTITUTIONAL CONSTRUCTION: DIVIDED POWERS AND 
CONSTITUTIONAL MEANING (1999) (providing the seminal discussion of construction).   
 120 Strang, Originalism as Popular Constitutionalism?, supra note 8, at 272-74.   
 121 But see Lawrence B. Solum, Communicative Content and Legal Content, 89 NOTRE 
DAME L. REV. 479, 483 (2013) (defining construction more broadly as “the determination of 
the legal content and legal effect produced by a legal text” even when the legal text 
determines the content and effect). 
 122 Id. at 497-98. 
 123 BARNETT, supra note 15, at 95-96. 
 124 Strang, Originalism and the Aristotelian Tradition, supra note 14, at 2008-09. 
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elected branches’ constitutional constructions.125 This is likely a significant limit on 
originalism, depending on how many constitutional questions are interpretative or 
constructive. The relative quantity of construction is an empirical question that must 
be answered on a case-by-case, doctrine-by-doctrine basis, and there is little 
discussion among scholars on this point.126 My tentative view is that many of the 
most important constitutional questions currently debated between originalists and 
nonoriginalists, are issues of interpretation, and not construction.127  
Second, some originalists have argued that the Constitution requires 
nonoriginalist precedent to trump the Constitution’s original meaning in some 
situations.128 These originalists have found that the original meaning of “judicial 
Power” in Article III requires federal judges to give precedent—including 
nonoriginalist precedent—“significant respect.”129 I argued elsewhere that federal 
judges should utilize three factors to determine when to refrain from overruling 
nonoriginalist precedent.130 
This has the potential to be a significant limit on originalism. My tentative view 
is that at least some of the most important nonoriginalist precedents should be 
preserved because such important cases will frequently implicate two of the three 
factors, reliance and “nonlegal justness.” These precedents will implicate reliance 
because their importance was frequently “cashed out” in Americans’ reliance on 
them. Also, the Supreme Court was frequently drawn toward a nonoriginalist result 
because of the perceived justness of the result. For example, in what is perhaps the 
most significant departure from the Constitution’s original meaning,131 the Supreme 
Court, in Home Building and Loan Ass’n v. Blaisdell,132 narrowly interpreted the 
Contracts Clause because of the perceived justice of impairing the mortgage 
contracts in question.133 Blaisdell has become one of the cornerstones of the modern 
                                                                                                                                          
 125 Lee J. Strang, The Role of the Common Good in Legal and Constitutional 
Interpretation, 3 U. ST. THOMAS L.J. 48, 70-72 (2005). 
 126 But see Solum, Communicative Content and Legal Content, supra note 121, at 483 
(describing the category of construction as relatively very large). 
 127 Here, I have in mind debates such as those over the scope of Congress’ Commerce 
Clause power, or whether the Due Process Clauses require the states and federal government 
to permit abortion, or whether the Establishment Clause prohibits public religious displays.  
 128 MCGINNIS & RAPPAPORT, supra note 29, at 175-96; Kurt Lash, Originalism, Popular 
Sovereignty, and Reverse Stare Decisis, 93 VA. L. REV. 1437 (2007); Strang, Originalism, 
Nonoriginalist Precedent, and the Common Good, supra note 18, at 419. 
 129 Strang, Originalism, Nonoriginalist Precedent, and the Common Good, supra note 18, 
at 420. 
 130 Id. at 472. 
 131 See JED RUBENFELD, REVOLUTION BY JUDICIARY: THE STRUCTURE OF AMERICAN 
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 67-68 (2005) (describing Blaisdell as counter to the paradigm case of 
what the Contracts Clause prohibited). 
 132 Home Bldg. and Loan Ass’n v. Blaisdell, 290 U.S. 398 (1934). 
 133 See RUBENFELD, supra note 131, at 68 (identifying this argument). 
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regulatory state because it permits significant state regulation of private economic 
life.134  
Third, originalism concerns only the Constitution’s original meaning; therefore, 
it has nothing to say about other subjects. For instance, the original meaning does not 
tell us whether states had the power to secede from the Union (prior to the Civil 
War).135 This was because the nature of the Constitution—was it a pact of states, or a 
covenant entered into by one national people?—is not answerable by the 
Constitution’s original meaning. Therefore, outside of the Constitution’s original 
meaning, originalism has no import.  
D. Pressuring Judges 
Originalism puts pressure on judicial competence in at least three areas: first, 
ascertaining the Constitution’s original meaning; second, constructing constitutional 
meaning; and, third, determining whether to overrule or limit nonoriginalist 
precedent. Because of this pressure, originalism has to be prudent about its 
expectations of judges’ ability to consistently produce accurate results 
First, ascertaining the Constitution’s original meaning exerts pressure on judicial 
competence. As my fellow Symposium Contributor, Mr. Charles, reminded us, 
judges are not historians136—though, luckily, originalism is not history. Judges must 
have the intelligence, time, access to resources and scholarship—and disposition—to 
investigate and articulate the Constitution’s publicly understood meaning at the time 
of ratification. Not every judge will possess these characteristics, at least not 
sufficiently, to always “get it right.” Therefore, even assuming good faith, originalist 
judges will “get it wrong” on occasion. 
Second, constructing constitutional meaning applies pressure on judicial 
competence.137 When the Constitution’s original meaning is underdetermined, judges 
must possess the requisite characteristics to know that the original meaning has in 
fact “run out.” They must also possess the characteristics to properly create 
constitutional doctrine that will advance the common good. These are challenging 
tasks.  Therefore, even assuming good faith, originalist judges will “get it wrong” on 
occasion.  
Third, determining whether to overrule or limit nonoriginalist precedent also 
pressures judicial competence. I argued elsewhere that the original meaning of 
“judicial Power” requires federal judges to give nonoriginalist precedent “significant 
respect,” and that this requires federal judges to utilizes three factors to decide 
                                                                                                                                          
 134 Douglas W. Kmiec & John O. McGinnis, The Contract Clause: A Return to the 
Original Understanding, 1 HAST. CONST. L.Q. 525, 544 (1987); Richard A. Epstein, Toward a 
Revitalization of the Contract Clause, 51 U. CHI. L. REV. 703, 735-38 (1984) (“Blaisdell . . . 
paved the way for massive government intervention.”).   
 135 Lee J. Strang, Originalism’s Limits: Interposition, Nullification, and Secession, in 
UNION AND STATES’ RIGHTS: A HISTORY AND INTERPRETATION OF INTERPOSITION, 
NULLIFICATION, AND SECESSION 150 YEARS AFTER SUMTER 204, 214-15 (Neil H. Cogan, ed., 
2014). 
 136 Patrick J. Charles, History in Law, Mythmaking, and Constitutional Legitimacy, 63 
CLEV. ST. L. REV. (forthcoming Nov. 2014).  
 137 See Strang, Originalism and the Aristotelian Tradition, supra note 14, at 2036-37 
(describing this). 
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whether to overrule nonoriginalist precedent.138 The three factors are: (1) to what 
extent does the nonoriginalist precedent deviate from the original meaning?; (2) to 
what extent, if any, would overruling the precedent harm Rule of Law values?; and 
(3) the nonlegal justness of the precedent.139 Both the identification of which 
precedents are nonoriginalist, and determining whether the three factors council 
overruling a particular precedent, will require judges with the right character and 
capacities.140 Not every judge will possess these characteristics, at least not 
sufficiently to always “get it right.” Therefore, even assuming good faith, originalist 
judges will “get it wrong” on occasion.  
Elsewhere, I argued that, because of these pressures on judges, originalism must 
incorporate virtue ethics into its conception of judicial selection and judging.141 For 
example, judges facing nonoriginalist precedent will need the virtue of justice-as-
lawfulness so that they have the disposition to follow the law—the Constitution’s 
original meaning—and not succumb to the nonoriginalist precedent’s perceived 
normative attractiveness.142 Incorporating virtue ethics into originalism will enable it 
to identify those people who are well-suited for judging, and help foster those 
characteristics necessary to originalist judging. Originalism, supplemented by virtue 
ethics, despite the pressures it places on judges’ capacities, has the ability to meet its 
goals, at least better than nonoriginalist alternatives.143  
IV. ORIGINALISM RETAINS ITS PROMISE (IN PART) BECAUSE OF ITS LIMITS 
Acknowledging these limits to originalism, its promises continue to hold true. 
Originalism promises: (1) normatively attractive results—though not perfection; (2) 
fit with key facets of the Constitution—though the Constitution’s original meaning is 
limited; and (3) respect for the competence of judges—though judges are likely to 
fail at the originalist enterprise, at least some of the time. 
Each of the three limits to originalism’s promise described above share the 
characteristic that one should expect from a human enterprise, such as judges144 
interpreting the United States Constitution145: limitedness. The Constitution is 
                                                                                                                                          
 138 Strang, Originalism, Nonoriginalist Precedent, and the Common Good, supra note 18, 
at 452, 472. 
 139 Id. at 472. 
 140 See Strang, Originalism and the Aristotelian Tradition, supra note 14, at 2033-36 
(describing this). 
 141 Id. 
 142 Id. 
 143 Tentatively, I believe that part of the reason for originalism’s superiority in this context 
is that the virtue of justice-as-lawfulness fits originalism better than nonoriginalism.  
 144 See also ALASDAIR MACINTYRE, DEPENDENT RATIONAL ANIMALS: WHY HUMAN BEINGS 
NEED THE VIRTUES 1 (1999) (“Some of the facts of human limitation and our consequent need 
of cooperation with others are more generally acknowledged, but for the most part only then 
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 145 See Daniel A. Farber, Our (Almost) Perfect Constitution, 12 CONST. COMMENT. 163, 
163 (1995) (“As with any human document, the answer [to whether the Constitution could 
have been improved] is undoubtedly ‘yes.’”); see also Monaghan, supra note 91, at 396 (“In 
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posited human law crafted by humans at particular times to achieve particular 
purposes,146 and judges interpreting it are likewise limited humans.147 Therefore, the 
Constitution and judicial interpretation are limited, and one should not expect it to 
achieve normative perfection,148 or answer all legal questions, or authorize federal 
judges to utilize tremendous power.149  
Originalism’s promises, appropriately limited, fit the Constitution’s positedness. 
It promises attainable normatively attractive results, faithfulness to the actual 
Constitution, and respect for judicial limits. These are modest promises. And, 
because they are modest, originalism is able to “deliver” on those promises. In sum, 
it is only through recognizing its limits that originalism is able to achieve its promise 
of legitimate interpretation. 
V. CONCLUSION 
In this brief Essay, I described what I take to be the three primary facets of 
originalism that make it a better interpretative methodology than alternatives. I 
argued that originalism promises relatively more normatively attractive 
constitutional interpretation, fit with the Constitution’s key characteristics, and 
respect for judicial capacities. I also acknowledged that originalism labors under 
limits, including less-than-ideal constitutional interpretations, limited constitutional 
meaning, and occasional judicial failure. Lastly, I noted that originalism’s limits 
argue in its favor because they reflect the limited nature of the Constitution and the 
humans who crafted and interpret it.  
 
                                                                                                                                          
short, perhaps the constitution guarantees only representative democracy, not perfect 
government.”); Raz, supra note 82, at 167 (“They [most positive laws] are not timelessly valid 
because they were enacted by a fallible social institution or approved by a referendum.”).  
 146 See John Finnis, The Truth in Legal Positivism, in THE AUTONOMY OF LAW: ESSAYS ON 
LEGAL POSITIVISM 195, 195 (Robert P. George, ed., 1996) (describing the concept of positive 
law in the Thomistic natural law tradition).  
 147 THE FEDERALIST NO. 51, at 1 (James Madison) (“If men were angels, no government 
would be necessary. If angels were to govern men, neither external nor internal controls on 
government would be necessary.”).  
 148 See also Michael Stokes Paulsen, Our Perfect, Perfect Constitution, 27 CONST. 
COMMENT. 531, 531 (2011) (suggesting, tongue-in-cheek, that he “now believe[s] that 
everything in the U.S. Constitution is perfect”).  
 149 See Finnis, supra note 146, at 195 (“Aquinas asserts and illustrates positive law’s 
variability and relativity to time, place, and polity, its admixture of human error and 
immorality, [and] its radical dependence on human creativity . . . .”). 
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